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ABSTRACT 
The contracting-out of job brokerage and case management services is a major 
international trend in the reform of the Public Employment Service. Instead of a 
public agency, private providers are contracted to deliver these services for the 
jobseekers. Australia and the Netherlands have contracted-out (almost) all of this 
formerly core public service. The U.K. has introduced so-called Employment 
Zones, in which private providers are responsible for long-term unemployed and 
thus replace the public Jobcentre Plus for this target-group. Based on agency 
theory, the paper analyses and compares the contract management in the three 
cases with respect to the risk of moral hazard. Differentiating between three dis-
tinct governance mechanisms (incentives, information and control), the paper 
shows the requirement of an integrated approach to contract management. 
 
 
 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Das Contracting-out der öffentlichen Arbeitsvermittlung und des Fallmanage-
ments für Langzeitarbeitslose ist eine der wesentlichen internationalen 
Entwicklungen in der Reform der öffentlichen Arbeitsverwaltung. Statt einer öf-
fentlichen Behörde werden dabei private Anbieter vertraglich beauftragt, diese 
Dienstleistungen für Arbeitssuchende zu erbringen. Australien und die Nieder-
lande sind bei dieser Auslagerung ehemals öffentlicher Dienstleistungen 
besonders weit gegangen. Großbritannien hat so genannte „Employment Zones“ 
eingerichtet, in denen private Anbieter für Langzeitarbeitslose zuständig sind und 
somit die Leistungen des Jobcentre Plus für diese Zielgruppe ersetzen. Ausge-
hend von der Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie analysiert und vergleicht der Aufsatz das 
Vertragsmanagement in den drei Ländern hinsichtlich des Moral Hazards. Ein 
effektives Governance-Konzept erfordert, dass die drei wesentlichen Steuerungs-
instrumente (Anreiz-, Informations- und Kontrollmechanismen) zu einem inte-
grierten Vertragsmanagement zusammengeführt werden. 
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1. Introduction 
Contracting out public services is not a new phenomenon (Kelman 2002; Savas 
1987; Sclar 2000). However, whereas in the past contracting was very often in-
put-related, the practice has shifted to performance contracting (Behn and Kant 
1999). More recently, this new paradigm also has reached social services, which 
have become subject to public tendering and performance contracting (Ryan 
1999; Smith and Lipsky 1993). One of the most recent new areas of public ser-
vices in which contracting-out can be observed is the Public Employment Service 
(PES). The PES usually is organized as a large public bureaucracy with local 
offices that offer labor market information, placement services, and active labor 
market policy measures for the unemployed. In addition, in some countries the 
PES also administers the provision of income support for unemployed jobseekers 
(OECD 2001; Thuy, Hansen, and Price 2001). In the United States, the PES is 
less visible as a unified institution because states have a high degree of freedom 
to manage employment services. Moreover, large programs such as the Job 
Partnership Training Act (JPTA) have created their own nationwide implementa-
tion structure independent of any social security agencies (OECD 1999). 
Expenditure for the PES constitutes a major item of the welfare budget in most 
Western welfare states. In the scope of this paper, employment services are de-
fined in very broad terms, and include all services used to reintegrate a jobseeker 
into the labor market. These employment, placement, or reintegration services 
(the terms will be used interchangeably throughout the paper) comprise in par-
ticular intensive job counseling and case management for long-term unemployed 
jobseekers. In 2002, some countries, such as Germany, France, and the Scandi-
navian countries, spent more than 1% of their gross domestic product on active 
labor market policy measures (including the administration of these services and 
of public placement services) (OECD 2004a, 319). Whereas job placement ser-
vices traditionally have been delivered in-house through the local PES offices, 
training programs usually have been outsourced to private training providers. In 
recent years, contracts have gained considerable importance internationally in 
steering public employment services (Mosley 2003; Sol and Westerveld 2005). 
On the one hand, Management by Objectives is used increasingly to guide the 
public administration itself (Mosley, Schütz, and Breyer 2001). On the other hand, 
governments increasingly rely on external service provision for placement ser-
vices that in the past were delivered in-house by public servants (Sol and 
Westerveld 2005). This latter development has gained momentum through recent 
reforms in Australia, the Netherlands, and the U.K. 
 Following the contracting-out of employment services, the government has to 
search for appropriate contract management tools. The central question in this 
 
 paper will thus be which governance mechanisms are most suitable for the con-
tracting-out of public employment services. The theoretical background of 
principal-agent theory will be used for the analysis. The governance mechanisms 
will be classified into three clusters: incentives, information, and control. Whereas 
incentives focus mainly on the optimal design of payment structures, information 
mechanisms usually make use of performance benchmarking and monitoring to 
increase the public purchaser’s knowledge about the private providers. Finally, 
control mechanisms are defined as extensive rules and regulations that state in 
great detail how providers have to deliver their services.  
For the United States, the analysis of the JPTA program has provided important 
insights into the weaknesses of performance-based training programs (Courty 
and Marschke 2003b, forthcoming; Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 2002; Heinrich 
1999). This paper will complement the findings from this research on training 
programs in two ways. First, a coherent framework of governance mechanisms is 
developed, which will show the need for the simultaneity and the interdepend-
ence of different mechanisms at any point in time. The paper is thus in line with 
current research that argues that traditional research primarily concentrated on 
the question of what services are suitable for contracting-out, rather than analyz-
ing the contract management itself (Brown and Potoski 2003b; Kelman 2002; 
Mosley and Sol 2001; Romzek and Johnston 2002). Second, the empirical basis 
of research into the contracting-out of employment services is extended by in-
cluding evidence from Australia, the Netherlands, and large-scale projects in the 
U.K. Some of the evidence presented in this paper was collected through expert 
interviews conducted in the three countries. With the notable exception of Struy-
ven and Steurs (2005), Grubb (2003), and Sol and Westerveld (2005), this kind of 
comparative international approach has received little attention up to now. As 
could be seen with the JPTA program, governance mechanisms have been 
changed significantly over the last twenty years in order to respond to weak-
nesses of the system (Courty and Marschke 2003a). An international perspective 
can add further evidence to this research, enabling an active rather than a reac-
tive design of governance systems. 
The three countries used for analysis in this paper were selected because they 
have proceeded furthest with the contracting out of public employment services. 
Thus, they are the ones for which the most experience is available and trends 
over time can be observed. In the future, other countries such as Denmark and 
Belgium might also be included in comparative analysis.1 Of course, comparisons 
may be made more difficult as, for instance, the scope (target groups as well as 
spatial coverage) of contracting-out differs or the public purchasing body is lo-
cated at a different government level (federal level vs. municipalities). 
Nevertheless, governance instruments still can be compared, as the goal in each 
case is to support a public-private contracting arrangement.  
                                            
1   For an analysis of some minor programs in Germany that use contracting as well as 
vouchers to include private providers, see Bruttel (2005a). 
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 The paper is organized as follows. The next two sections lay the foundation of the 
paper by presenting the theory used for the analysis as well as describing the 
institutional arrangements of the three countries. The main part of the paper then 
analyzes the design and implementation of the three governance mechanisms 
(section 4). Section 5 discusses the implications for contracting out employment-
related services and provides some conclusions for possible directions of future 
research. 
2. Neo-institutional economics, agency theory,  
and contracting 
In their analysis of contracting-out, researchers and scholars increasingly have 
made use of neo-institutional economics. In the last three decades, neo-
institutional economics itself has become a standard tool in the analysis of differ-
ent institutional arrangements. By the early 1990s, for example, Williamson’s two 
major works (1975; 1985) on transaction cost economics had become the most 
frequently cited books in the social sciences (Ghemawat 2000). The range of 
theories included under the label “new institutional economics” is nevertheless 
very wide. In general, they share the aim of explaining the structure, behavior, 
efficiency, and change of economic institutions. Conventionally, the term neo-
institutional economics comprises transaction cost economics, property rights 
theory, and principal-agent theory (Furubotn and Richter 1998; Picot and Wolff 
1994). Transaction cost economics relates different institutional governance ar-
rangements (hierarchy, hybrid, market) to different transaction characteristics 
(asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency). The less specific a transaction is, 
the more efficiently a market mechanism works and the less efficient a hierarchi-
cal arrangement becomes. The property rights approach (De Alessi 1980; 
Furubotn and Pejovich 1972) argues that the efficiency of organizations depends 
on the direct assignment of property rights to an individual. Following this line of 
reasoning, firms in private ownership are expected to work more efficiently be-
cause efficiency gains are directly attributable to an individual. Thus, both 
theories are useful in evaluating the benefits of one institutional arrangement 
over another.2  
Principal-agent theory is less concerned with whether to deliver a service through 
a public or a private organization. Its main focus is on the dilemma of how to 
make an agent (e.g. an employee or contractor) act in the interest of the principal 
(e.g. an employer or purchaser) (Eisenhardt 1989; Gibbons 1998; Sappington 
                                            
2   For a framework incorporating transaction cost economics, property rights theory and 
agency theory to evaluated private delivery arrangements in the field of public em-
ployment services see Bruttel (2005a). For research that uses transaction costs to 
explain the contracting of municipal services, see, for instance, Brown and Potoski 
(2002; 2003a). 
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 1991). This conflict arises when one assumes asymmetric information between 
the two parties, risk aversion on the side of the agent, uncertainty, and a diver-
gence of the agent’s goals from those of the principal. The consequence is that a 
public purchaser is unable to observe the actions that a contracted private pro-
vider undertakes, and at the same time the public purchaser must assume that 
private providers maximize their own utility rather than work for the goals of the 
public purchaser. Agency theory aims at developing governance structures that 
allow for a solution or at least an attenuation of this trade-off. Private as well as 
public institutions share these conflicts. 
Following these assumptions, the main risk of contracting is moral hazard (Picot 
and Wolff 1994). Moral hazard occurs after the contract has been signed and can 
be defined as those actions of the agents which maximize their own utility to the 
detriment of that of the principal in situations in which their actions cannot be fully 
observed. Classic examples are the situation of a landlord and a tenant farmer or 
that of an employer and an employee. In both cases, the agents have divergent 
interests from those of the principal. The tenant farmer and the employee will, 
given a fixed payment for their work, reduce their workload. At the same time, 
however, the principals are only able to observe results, which may be influenced 
by factors other than effort, making rewards based on results difficult. In the case 
of employment services, the government is unable to observe the effort of private 
providers to place participants into jobs. The only variable that usually is available 
is the number of placements achieved, though this outcome does not necessarily 
include any information on the contribution of an individual provider to this place-
ment.  
In general, three sets of governance mechanisms that solve or mitigate the prin-
cipal-agent problem of moral hazard can be distinguished (Ebers and Gotsch 
1999, 214): incentive mechanisms, information mechanisms, and control mecha-
nisms. The intent behind incentive mechanisms is to align the interests of the 
agent to those of the principal through design. This can be achieved by designing 
payment structures in which the agent’s maximization of its own profits also 
maximizes the utility of the government. Usually, this arrangement takes the form 
of performance-based payments. Information mechanisms aim directly at the 
information asymmetry by increasing the government’s information about the 
providers’ efforts. A widely used tool is performance benchmarking (Behn and 
Kant 1999; Courty and Marschke 2004). Another, more direct way is to monitor 
the provider’s behavior directly through regular audits, for instance. Finally, con-
trol mechanisms implement extensive rules and regulations that state in great 
detail how providers have to deliver their services. However, this approach fun-
damentally works against the rationale of contracting-out, which is intended to 
increase rather than decrease the flexibility of service provision (Mulgan 1997). 
Most research focuses on only one of these mechanisms at a time. In particular, 
the design of performance-based payment structures and performance-
evaluating benchmarking systems have attracted considerable interest. In the 
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 case of employment services, and social services more generally, the deficien-
cies of past contracting arrangements often were due to a reliance on one 
mechanism and a failure to understand the interdependence of all three. It will be 
argued that only a coherent strategy that combines the three mechanisms satis-
fies the requirements for effective contract management. 
3. The institutional set-up of contracting regimes  
in Australia, the Netherlands, and the U.K. 
The following subsections describe the contracting regime for public employment 
services in Australia, the Netherlands, and the U.K. Even though the countries 
differ with respect to their institutional set-up, the principal design of the admini-
stration of public employment services in the three countries is presented in 
Figure 1. In general, we can observe a division of the responsibilities for benefit 
administration and payment on the one hand and job placement services on the 
other (in particular for jobseekers who are not job-ready). The “residual” PES is 
responsible for benefit administration, and often has a gateway function for fur-
ther services (including the referral of jobseekers to private providers). This idea  
 
Figure 1:  Basic structure of privatized PES 
   
  Australia:  Department of Employment and  
  Workplace Relations 
 The Netherlands:  Social Insurance Body UWV 
 U.K.:  Department for Work and Pensions 
 
     
Management by  
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1 SUWI stands for Structuur Uitvoeringsorganisatie Werk en Inkomen which is the name 
of the Act introducing the new market-style regime for reintegration services. 
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 of a one-stop shop is again an international trend (Clasen, Duncan, Eardley, Ev-
ans, Ughetto, van Oorschot, and Wright 2001). Although Centrelink in Australia 
does not offer any placement services (except self-help facilities, such as touch-
screens displaying vacancies), the Dutch Centre for Work and Income is also in 
charge of short-term jobseekers. The Employment Zones in the U.K. are project 
regions in which private providers are contracted only for the case management 
of long-term jobseekers. Jobcentre Plus thus offers the full range of public em-
ployment services (including benefit administration and job counseling) for all 
mainstream jobseekers. 
3.1 Australia 
Australia introduced its contracting-out regime, called the Job Network, in 1998. 
The public one-stop shop for social benefits, Centrelink, takes care of the unem-
ployment benefit payments, profiles the jobseekers using the Job Seeker 
Classification Instrument (JSCI), and refers them to a private provider. The De-
partment of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) contracts the private 
providers centrally, even though there are separate contracts for each of the 137 
Employment Service Areas. Contract periods usually last about three years. The 
selection of providers is based on two criteria: the capacity to deliver services 
(40%) and the capacity to achieve outcomes (60%). The capacity to deliver ser-
vices is mainly an input-related factor (e.g. staff qualifications, methods used, 
suitability of the office); the capacity to achieve outcome is mainly a quantitative 
factor that takes into account past performance. Prices are set administratively 
and thus are not a criterion for selection. The third Employment Services Contract 
has been running since July 2003 (referred to as ESC 3).3  
In the first two contract periods there were three major services to jobseekers: 
Job Matching, Job Search Training, and Intensive Assistance. Depending on the 
barriers to employment identified during the profiling, jobseekers were eligible for 
one of the three services. Since the advent of the third contract, this distinction of 
services was abolished in favor of a continuum of services. All jobseekers follow 
the same track, starting with minor counseling and job search training. Only after 
12 months does a period of Intensive Support customised assistance (ISca) be-
gin. However, about 20% of newly registered jobseekers are classified as “highly 
disadvantaged” and referred directly to the ISca program. Besides the general 
services, to which most of the clients are referred, there are also specialist pro-
viders that have specialized in working with certain groups of clients (e.g. people 
with hearing impairments or AIDS).  
The providers face a mixed funding model. Although they are paid up-front for the 
services they deliver, any other payments are made per outcome. An outcome is 
                                            
3   ESC = Employment Services Contract. ESC 1 lasted from May 1998 to February 
2000, ESC 2 from March 2000 to June 2003. 
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 principally defined in terms of acquiring a job for the client; the first payment is 
applicable after 13 weeks on the job, the second after 26 weeks on the job. The 
proportions between both components are discussed further below. Additionally, 
providers have a Job Seeker Account at their disposal, which is a budget that 
varies according to the status of “highly disadvantaged” and locational disadvan-
tage and includes up to $1,150 for the first ISca period and up to $639 for the 
second ISca period, which starts after 24 months of unemployment.4 The funds 
only can be used for expenditure for the jobseeker (e.g. training, clothes, mobile 
phones). Furthermore, there is a training account of up to $584 which is available 
for older jobseekers and indigenous jobseekers. Because the public vacancy 
database depends exclusively on input from the providers (and employers), pro-
viders are paid a job placement fee (up to $401) if a jobseeker is placed in a 
vacancy that was listed on the national vacancy database by the provider.  
3.2 The Netherlands 
On January 1, 2002, the Netherlands introduced a similar system with respect to 
the division of labor between the public and the private sector. In addition to the 
administration of public employment services, the reform also encompasses a 
more far-reaching reallocation of responsibilities between the public and the pri-
vate sector (Sol 2001; Struyven and Steurs 2002). For instance, employers 
increasingly are being made responsible for incapacity benefits. The public Cen-
tres for Work and Income, which are the “residual” PES, are a one-stop shop that 
is responsible for profiling, insurance data collection, the placement of job-ready 
clients, and the administration of the vacancy database. The jobseekers are pro-
filed using the Kansmeter and a more in-depth interview technique called Kwint 
(qualification intake). Jobseekers are classified into different streams, with 
Stream A containing jobseekers who are job ready and Stream B containing 
those who have multiple (often nonvocational) barriers to employment.5 Stream A 
clients are expected to return to employment within six months and are serviced 
by the Centres for Work and Income, whereas the others are referred to either a 
case manager by the social insurance body (UWV) (if they are eligible for unem-
ployment benefit or disability benefit) or a municipal case manager (if they are 
only eligible for social assistance). These case managers in turn refer them to 
private providers.6 In 2002, 183,000 persons received unemployment benefit, 
977,000 disability benefit, and 384,000 social assistance. In this paper the focus 
is solely on the UWV contracts, as only these contracts replace the PES.7  
                                            
4   To ease comparisons, all currencies have been converted into U.S. dollars through 
use of the 2003 Purchasing Power Parities quoted in OECD (2004b). 
5   Before January 1, 2005, there were four streams, of which Stream 1 clients stayed 
with Centres for Work and Income and the others were referred to private providers. 
6   For a description of the rather complex institutional set-up of the Dutch social security 
system, see Struyven and Steurs (2002). 
7   For an analysis of the municipalities market, see Sol and Hoogtanders (2005), and De 
Koning (2004). 
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 Private providers are selected in a one-stage tender (formerly a two-stage tender 
in 2002) on the grounds of experience, offered outcome rate, price, and method. 
Contracts are tendered in tranches within one of the six regions in which the 
country has been divided for labor market administration, based on target groups 
(e.g. there are five tranches with 150 clients each for jobseekers older than 50 in 
Region 1). There are five target groups for unemployment benefit clients (job-
seekers with social/economic problems, jobseekers older than 50, jobseekers 
Phase 2, jobseekers Phases 3 and 4, and jobseekers from ethnic minorities), and 
up to 17 for disability benefit clients (of which some consist of only one hundred 
jobseekers nationwide).  
In the first two contract periods (2001 and 2002), providers were contracted on 
the basis of product. Taking into consideration the perceived jobseeker’s needs, 
a private provider suggested a range of products (e.g. diagnosis, agreement on 
an action plan, a training course, assessment center training, post-placement 
support) and was paid for these products partly at the time of delivery, partly at 
the time when an outcome was achieved. For most unemployment benefit clients, 
the rule was about a fifty-fifty split (i.e. 50% of the price was paid up-front, the 
other 50% when an outcome was achieved), although the more difficult-to-place 
target groups would give rise to a higher fixed component. This rather complex 
system, which involved a high degree of administration, was abolished in the con-
tracts starting from 2003. Currently, providers offer a total price that consists of 
three parts: an action plan; a trajectory, which is the actual case management; 
and post-placement support. In the first stage, providers receive a (completely 
input-related) payment for the agreement of an action plan. The main part of the 
total payment is the price for the actual trajectory, of which the first half is paid 
after six months and the other half is paid after an outcome is achieved. Finally, 
there is a payment for post-placement support. Recently, the UWV has increased 
the proportion of “no cure, no pay” contracts, in particular for easier-to-place cli-
ents. In these contracts, providers only receive a payment after placement in a 
job lasting six months has been achieved. If they are not successful in placing a 
client, they do not receive a single cent. 
3.3 U.K. Employment Zones8
Unlike Australia and the Netherlands, the Employment Zones in the U.K. cover 
only 13 (originally 15) generally very deprived areas with high unemployment 
rates, and focus on long-term unemployed persons only. Jobcentre Plus refers 
jobseekers who have been unemployed for more than 18 of the last 21 months to 
private providers. The current Employment Zone contracts, which started in Oc-
tober 2003 and April 2004, respectively, have contract durations of five to seven 
years. There are two kinds of Employment Zones. In Single Provider Zones, one 
provider is contracted exclusively to deliver the services for all jobseekers in that 
                                            
8   For a more detailed analysis of the Employment Zones see Bruttel (2005b). 
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 area. In Multiple Provider Zones up to four providers are awarded a fixed market 
share. The case management has three stages. In Stage 1, which lasts four 
weeks, the private case manager and the jobseeker agree on an action plan. In 
Stage 2, the private providers completely take over employment services for the 
jobseeker for 26 weeks (including benefit payments). After these 26 weeks, a 
jobseeker for whom no placement has been achieved returns to Jobcentre Plus 
and is eligible for another Employment Zone period only after another 18 months 
of unemployment. However, for a period of 22 weeks following Stage 2, providers 
can still work together with the jobseeker in a so-called Follow-On period. If they 
manage to place the jobseeker, they can still claim the outcome fees. The pro-
viders are paid $470 for the first four weeks and receive an amount at the 
beginning of the 26-week period which is equal to the average unemployment 
benefit payment for 21 weeks. In turn, however, they must pay unemployment 
benefits to the jobseeker for a maximum of 26 weeks. Thus, if they do not man-
age to place the client within 26 weeks, they incur a loss for this individual client. 
All other payments are outcome-based ($627 for a placement and $3,762 or 
$5,643 for a 13-week job outcome).9  
4. Governance mechanisms 
The last two sections introduced the theoretical framework for the analysis and 
outlined the institutional arrangements in the three countries. In this section, I 
analyze governance mechanisms intended to facilitate the principal-agent rela-
tionship. For this purpose, I use the categories discussed in the theory section, 
that is, incentives, information, and control.  
However, before starting with the analysis, it is useful to recall some basic as-
sumptions and parameters of contracting-out. One of the major reasons to 
contract out public employment services is the increased efficiency and flexibility 
associated with private providers. According to property rights theory, private 
providers are assumed to work more efficiently than public bureaucracy. At the 
same time, the new system emphasizes outcomes over processes. Hence, the 
government does not prescribe what private providers have to do but rather pays 
them for outcomes, and there is a high degree of flexibility for providers in how 
they want to organize their services. At the core of the principal-agent relationship 
is the difference between the objective function of private providers and that of 
the government. The private providers’ goal is to maximize their (operational) 
profits, whereas the government can be thought of as applying a cost-benefit 
analysis in which (in its simplest form) it trades off unemployment benefits and 
                                            
9   Figures refer to Single Provider Zones. In Multiple Provider Zones, the fees for 13-
week outcomes are $3,135 and $4,702, respectively. 
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 reintegration costs. Thus, the government needs to design mechanisms that si-
multaneously maximize both objective functions.  
4.1 Incentive mechanisms 
4.1.1 Outcome-related payments 
For all countries, outcome-related payments are the single most important gov-
ernance mechanism to align the interests of the private providers with those of 
the public purchaser. In general, fees are split into a fixed commencement com-
ponent and an outcome-related component that is paid only after 13 and/or 26 
weeks of sustained employment. Thus, providers face constant marginal incen-
tives because the award function is linear, like that in a piece-rate compensation 
function. This contrasts with the situation in the JPTA program, in which most 
states paid performance bonuses only if a certain threshold was achieved (Courty 
and Marschke 2003b). Table 1 shows the payment structures of the first three 
contracts for Australia. For ESC 1, three levels of Intensive Assistance were dis-
tinguished, which corresponded to the severity of placement barriers for an 
individual jobseeker; for ESC 2 there were two such levels. In ESC 3, payments 
are now related to the duration of unemployment, which is taken as a proxy for 
employment barriers. Outcome payments increase with a longer unemployment 
duration. Only during the first twelve months is the proportion of the commence- 
 
Table 1:  Outcome payments in Australia, 1998-2006 (in U.S. dollars)  
 ESC 1 ESC 2 ESC 3  (months of unemployment) 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3    A B  3–12 13–24 25–36a 36+ 
Payment structure          
Commencement fee 1,095 1,642 2,190 786 1,549 606 1,898 2,682 2,828
13-week outcome 1,095 1,642 2,336 1,835 3,615 401 1,204 2,409 3,212
26-week outcome 876 1,606 2,190 782 1,565 0 620 1,204 1,606
Total 3,066 4,891 6,715 3,404 6,729 1,007 3,723 6,296 7,646
Distribution (in %)         
Commencement fee 36 34 33 23 23 60 51 43 37 
13 weeks 36 34 35 54 54 40 32 38 42 
26 weeks 29 33 33 23 23  17 19 21 
 
Source: For ESC 1 and 2, see Productivity Commission (2002, 10.18); for ESC 3, see 
DEWR (2002b, 53) and own calculations.  
Note: For ESC 3, it was assumed that the jobseeker is placed at the end of a particular 
period of unemployment (e.g. after 3 months, 12 months, 24 months, or 36 months). The 
commencement fee for 25–36 months, for instance, also includes all payments made in 
the periods before. For 36+ a placement at 48 months is assumed. The commencement 
fee for ESC 3 also includes the Job Seeker Account.  
a  This category also includes highly disadvantaged jobseekers. 
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 ment fee higher, which is due to the fact that there is hardly any outcome fee at 
this time. Furthermore, the 13-week outcome attracts the major proportion of pay-
ments. For twelve months of unemployment or less, it is actually only the 13-
week outcome which is rewarded with an outcome fee at all. 
Table 2 shows the payment structure in the U.K. Employment Zones. In order to 
understand the table, it is important to remember the system of Employment 
Zones, in which providers are paid the unemployment benefit for 21 weeks up-
front in Stage 2 and in turn are responsible for payments to the client during a 
maximum of 26 weeks in this stage. If they place a client at any time in Stage 2 
they can keep the remaining amount as profit. If they need more than 21 weeks, 
they have to deal with an extra burden. During that time, the Employment Zone 
providers also have the authority of the secretary of state to stop payments inde-
pendently.10 A system that makes the providers responsible for the payment of 
unemployment benefit is often seen as the one with the strongest and best incen-
tives (Dykstra and De Koning 2004, 294) 
Table 2:  Income for a provider in the U.K. Employment Zones, 2004  
(in U.S. dollars)  
 Placement after  
one day in Stage 2 
Placement after  
21 weeks in Stage 2 
Placement after  
26 weeks in Stage 2 
   $ %   $ %   $ % 
Stage 1 470 6 470 8 470 9 
Stage 2  2,371 29 0 0 –568 –11 
Placement fee 627 8 627 11 627 12 
13-week outcome fee  4,702 58 4,702 82 4,702 90 
Total 8,171 100 5,799 100 5,232 100 
 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2003), own calculations.  
The fact that fixed and outcome-related payments are combined in all countries 
shows the trade-off between optimal incentive contracts and the risk aversion of 
the providers (Gibbons 1998; Sappington 1991). In the field of social services, the 
cooperation of the client is a major input factor, which the provider can only par-
tially influence.11 In addition, many (especially small) providers are exposed to 
serious cash-flow problems when faced with a pure outcome-payment system 
because the costs incur up-front whereas the payments lag by many months in 
some cases. The Netherlands tries to overcome this dilemma by paying 20% of 
the fees in the “no cure, no pay” contracts in advance. If a provider does not 
place a client, it has to repay this money. Whether these “no cure, no pay” con-
                                            
10  In this case, jobseekers have to re-apply for Jobseeker Allowance at the local Job-
centre Plus. During this procedure, the validity of the ceasing of payment is controlled 
by Jobcentre Plus. 
11  See Fountain (2001) for the distinct characteristics of public services in contrast to 
private services. 
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 tracts really are more efficient is doubtful. Many providers in the Netherlands 
have increased their prices in reaction to the new principle, in order to accommo-
date the higher risk. This response is in line with theory, if we assume that 
providers want to achieve a constant expected income. Instead of a “no cure, no 
pay” system, a structure that pays providers relatively small amounts at different 
stages is able to reduce this risk premium and thus reduce the total price, too. 
Providers seem to pass on incentives to case managers and sometimes even to 
jobseekers. Performance-related salaries are the rule in all three countries. As a 
rule of thumb, one (sustainable) placement of a long-term unemployed person 
per week can be seen as the average performance target for most case manag-
ers. In the Employment Zones around 20% of clients have been promised a 
reward if they achieve sustainable employment (Hales, Taylor, Mandy, and Miller 
2003). One expert interview revealed a systematic approach in which the pro-
vider paid clients $627 if they found a job (and kept it for 13 weeks) within 4 
weeks after starting Stage 2, $549 within 8 weeks, $470 within 12 weeks, and so 
on. An additional $78 was paid if clients found the job themselves.  
4.1.2 Definition of successful outcomes and earmarked payments 
In changing the focus from payments for inputs to pay for results, the contracting 
systems have changed from the paradigm of regulatory contracting to that of per-
formance contracting (Behn and Kant 1999). Former indicators for controlling 
were often related to inputs (e.g. clients per staff member). This approach was 
followed by a period of output measures (e.g. placements), whereas recently out-
come measures (e.g. placements into a job that lasts a minimum of 13 or 26 
weeks) have become increasingly popular. This focus on sustainable employ-
ment outcomes counteracts the tendency to have placements into short-term jobs 
only. The definition of successful outcomes is similar in all three examples (see 
Table 3). In Australia and for Dutch jobseekers on unemployment benefits, the 
outcome payments are linked most consequently to the reduction in unemploy-
ment compensation. In the U.K. and for Dutch jobseekers on incapacity benefits, 
we find a minimum-hour requirement. Self-employment also is accepted as an 
outcome (and is proven through the discontinuation of benefit payments). 
Employment durations of 13 and 26 weeks have emerged internationally as ma-
jor milestones because they are useful indicators. In Australia, 65% of jobseekers 
who were in employment 13 weeks after their placement were still in employment 
after one year (DEWR 2004). In the Netherlands, even 86% of disability benefit 
recipients were still employed one year after their first placement (Algemene 
Rekenkamer 2001). The emphasis on employment reflects the Work First phi-
losophy of the labor market policy in all three countries, a philosophy that favors 
employment outcomes over education outcomes, such as placement into a full-
time training course (Bruttel and Sol 2006; Theodore and Peck 2001). In line with 
this policy approach, wage levels and considerations about the quality of place-
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 ments also are seen as secondary concerns at best. Obviously, such an ap-
proach does not suit all target groups. For benefit recipients for whom 
employment on the immediate labor market is not a realistic goal in the short 
term, other, less easy to define outcomes need to be specified. This is likely to 
increase the complexity of the contracts.   
Table 3:  Definition of successful outcomes 
 Australia The Netherlands U.K. 
Kind of  
employment  
must be enough to  
reduce unemployment 
benefits by 100% 
unemployment benefit: 
benefits stop 
disability benefit:  
at least half of the possible 
individual working time 
minimum of  
16 hours per week 
Duration of 
employment 
first payment after 13 
weeks, second payment 
after 26 weeks  
6 months 13 weeks 
Wage subsidies  
allowed yes
a yes nob
 
a  Payment comes from the Job Seeker Account.  
b  If public wage subsidies are used, the 13-week period only begins to accrue after the 
wage subsidy ends.  
One of the aims of contracting out public employment services was to enable the 
increased flexibility that providers would have in using the funds available. In the 
Netherlands, this recently has been highlighted through the removal of product-
based contracting and the use of lump-sum payments to providers for the whole 
reintegration process. Interestingly, Australia recalled such a policy after the first 
two contract periods because surveys showed that only 11% of Intensive Assis-
tance customers took part in further training and a mere 3% were gaining work 
experience (DEWR 2001, 63). It is, however, less the contracting per se that 
should be blamed for this low investment in training. It is, rather, a political ques-
tion of which kind of services are financed. Thus, the vehicle “contracting-out” 
should not be mistaken for the program content of active labor market policy. If 
the government appreciated training as an effective method for helping job-
seekers, there would be ways to implement structures within these private 
delivery arrangements which would foster investments in training. One option 
would be a matched funding model in which the government would match private 
providers’ expenditure on vocational training for the jobseekers (Productivity 
Commission 2002). The Job Seeker Account may indeed be seen as a reaction 
to the problem of under-investment, as funds can be spent only on the jobseeker 
and are otherwise lost.  
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 4.1.3 Creaming and parking 
Quasi-markets for social services which use incentives in the form of outcome-
based payments are often confronted with creaming and parking (Donahue 1989; 
Le Grand and Bartlett 1993; Smith and Lipsky 1993). This is particularly true for 
public employment services (Courty and Marschke 2003b; Dockery and Strom-
back 2001; Struyven and Steurs 2005). Because the whole idea of contracting-
out is built around incentive-induced behavior, there are serious consequences if 
incentives are not designed well. An optimal contract would reward providers on 
the basis of their net impact on the situation of a jobseeker. Hence, the greater 
their contribution to the placement of a jobseeker; the higher their payment 
should be. However, it is very difficult to measure the net impact of treatment on 
an individual client. A measure of net impact would have to take into account the 
counterfactual situation of nontreatment, that is, what would have happened to 
the jobseeker if the private provider had not counseled him or her. Thus, real-
world measures usually take only the gross results (i.e. total placements) as a 
proxy for the provider’s impact. However, by only taking into account the gross 
results, the government implicitly assumes that the impact is constant for all job-
seekers. Because providers are paid on the basis of crude placement results, 
they are encouraged to assist those who are easiest to place regardless of 
whether the provider’s service actually makes any difference. This behavior is 
referred to as “creaming” (Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 2002). On the other 
end, “parking” describes a situation in which jobseekers are not helped at all.  
The contract management systems in the countries under consideration have 
developed different instruments to deal with these problems. A very common 
strategy is to differentiate payments according to target groups. Ideally, profiling 
instruments are used to classify jobseekers according to their needs with respect 
to the services that would be most useful in helping them find a new job (Hasluck 
2004; OECD 1998). Within these groups the net impact on outcomes is assumed 
to be identical, which still creates problems. In Australia, the Jobseeker Classifi-
cation Instrument is used for this profiling; in the Netherlands, the Centre for 
Work and Income uses the Kansmeter. Both are based on questionnaires. In the 
Netherlands, clients also may be profiled in more depth through a structured in-
terview (Kwint). Both systems have been criticized in the past for their inaccuracy 
(Productivity Commission 2002; Vos, van den Berg, and Vroome 2003). For Aus-
tralia, criticism also has focused on the way the profiling is done. Major problems 
are that clients do not reveal their true situation because benefit assessment and 
profiling are carried out in the same interview, and that the time frame is too lim-
ited (around 15 minutes on average) and the training of the staff insufficient. 
However, there is also a structural problem in that the target groups are defined 
very broadly and in many cases are not optimally linked to the profiling instru-
ments. Client groups in Australia are defined only by the length of unemployment 
duration, and the profiling is only relevant for an extra group of highly disadvan-
taged persons. In the Netherlands the five target groups for unemployed 
jobseekers and up to 17 for jobseekers on incapacity benefits are rather one-
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 dimensional (e.g. ethnic minorities, older jobseekers). Finally, in the U.K. the allo-
cation of jobseekers to private providers is subject to a threshold of 18 months of 
unemployment. It becomes obvious that target groups defined in these ways are 
not suitable for addressing the problems of quite heterogeneous groups.  
4.2 Information mechanisms 
Information mechanisms are the second type of governance instrument used to 
tackle principal-agent problems. The design of information mechanisms should 
aim at an increased transparency of information for the government in order to 
overcome the asymmetric information between parties, which is one of the rea-
sons for moral hazard. The two main instruments are benchmarking and 
monitoring. The first indirectly compares the impact of providers on the employ-
ment outcomes of clients, whereas the second directly observes the delivery 
process of the individual provider.  
Benchmarking offers a way to measure the relative performance of providers. By 
using advanced econometric modeling, it enables a comparison of providers 
across different regions because the computations are able to control for external 
context variables (e.g. local labor market conditions) (Courty and Marschke 2004; 
Sappington 1991). Thus, even if providers are given a local or regional monopoly, 
their results can still be compared to providers in other regions. However, for 
benchmarking to work for employment services, it is also necessary to include 
variables on the personal characteristics of the jobseeker (e.g. duration of unem-
ployment, age, educational background). Otherwise comparisons are biased. For 
instance, Provider A may have placed many more clients into jobs than Provider 
B, but, taking into consideration the clients’ barriers to employment, Provider A 
actually added much less value to the job outcome of clients as they had a high 
probability of finding a job anyway (see the subsection “Creaming and Parking” 
above). 
Australia has implemented a highly sophisticated benchmarking system. The so-
called Star Rating compares the placement results of all providers by using a 
logit/probit regression model that controls for labor market conditions (i.e. re-
gional employment growth, local unemployment level, major industries in a 
region, a dummy variable for the five largest cities, and the geographical size of 
the labor market) and for personal characteristics of the jobseekers (e.g. gender, 
age, educational attainment, duration of unemployment, status as an indigenous 
Australian, as a person with a disability, and/or as a lone parent) (Access Eco-
nomics 2002; DEWR 2002a). Providers are ranked according to their controlled 
result and are awarded with stars. Five-star providers are at the top of the league, 
one-star providers perform significantly below average. In Australia, the Star Rat-
ing exercises a significant incentive for existing providers. In the transition from 
the second to the (current) third contract, the best 60% of existing providers on 
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 the basis of the Star Rating were offered a contract renewal (without tender). 
From the point of view of game theory, the providers take part in a repeated 
game in which long-term considerations (such as reputation) are more relevant 
for business decisions than one-off profits (Axelrod 1984; Milward and Provan 
2000). 
In the Netherlands and the U.K., such econometric benchmarking models do not 
exist. Providers are compared on the basis of crude placement figures. The pub-
lic purchasing bodies argue that the disparities arising from geographic 
differences are not that relevant. For the Netherlands, the six regions that form 
the basis for the tender of employment services are in a rather small and eco-
nomically uniform country, whereas the U.K. Employment Zones are all in some 
of the most deprived areas in the country and thus share common economic 
conditions. For personal characteristics, in the Netherlands comparisons are 
made between the target groups. In the U.K. the results are only compared for all 
Employment Zone participants. Thus, there is a significant danger of creaming 
and parking, given the lack of information control for personal characteristics.   
The second form of information mechanism is direct monitoring of the providers’ 
behavior. The aim is to overcome the “black box” — that sphere where the gov-
ernment does not know what the individual provider does. In Australia, monitoring 
is done through a mix of desktop monitoring via an integrated computer system 
and visits to the individual providers. Every contact with the jobseeker is recorded 
in a Web-based database. The department can access the database at any time 
and hence observe the service provided for every jobseeker in the country in real 
time. Desktop monitoring means that monitoring takes the form of controlling the 
integrated database. A risk management tool in which providers and each of their 
sites are assessed according to the risk of failing to deliver the services properly 
accompanies the whole system of monitoring. Following this assessment, the 
number of monitoring visits is fixed and may vary from one per year to up to four 
and more if it is a new site from a new provider or if problems have occurred in 
the past. In the near future, this risk assessment will be enhanced by an elec-
tronic tool that alerts the contract manager whenever there are irregularities with 
a provider’s site, for example if a client has not had an appointment with the pro-
vider for more than four weeks.  
In the Netherlands, monitoring is still in its early stages. The government favors 
self-regulation by the industry. Borea, the industry’s top organization, has devel-
oped a Keurmerk (quality certificate) which includes annual audits by external 
(but private) certification companies. Additionally, the UWV meets every three 
months to discuss written reports by the providers and to crosscheck the data 
from both sides. The latter is needed because there is no integrated system and 
most communication is carried out through paperwork or on floppy disk. An inter-
esting approach can be seen in the involvement of clients in the monitoring 
process. The provider’s three-month reports on each jobseeker on their register 
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 need to be countersigned by the individual jobseeker, who thereby experiences 
empowerment in the provider-client relationship. 
In the U.K., the monitoring also is done through visits to the providers. However, 
due to the small number of only three providers in the first contract round and 
seven providers in the current round, monitoring can still take place in a more 
informal and personal way than in the case of a country-wide system with hun-
dreds of providers, like that in Australia. The monitoring, however, is focused on 
claimed outcomes. Thus, clients for whom no outcome has been claimed are not 
part of the monitoring. 
4.3 Control mechanisms 
The third form of governance mechanism discussed in the literature is control. 
Control mechanisms such as rules and regulations are the traditional tools of 
public bureaucracy. Control in the form of extensive rules and regulations thus 
contrasts with the rationale of increased flexibility and a focus on outcomes rather 
than processes, which motivated the introduction of private delivery arrange-
ments (Mosley 2003; Mulgan 1997). For Australia, Considine (2001) indeed 
found evidence from surveys that private case managers are less guided in their 
daily work by central rules than are the staff of PES in other countries in which 
the PES is still a public bureaucracy. This in turn gives them more flexibility to 
find individually tailored solutions for jobseekers.  
Reduced control in this context should not be misunderstood as a complete with-
drawal of the government from the process of services delivery. Instead of 
distinct instructions, the contracts usually contain a quality management frame-
work. In Australia, the contracts contain an Employment Services Code of 
Practice and a Job Network Service Guarantee, although their content may be 
described as rather “soft” (e.g. “acting with honesty, due care and diligence”). As 
mentioned above, in the Netherlands the government relies heavily on self-
regulation of the industry, whereas in the U.K. the Contractor’s Guide to Employ-
ment Zones sets out the basic quality requirements. To check compliance with 
these rules, the government uses the monitoring mechanisms described in the 
previous section. In addition, it relies on the clients, who are given the opportunity 
to complain if they are not satisfied with a provider’s service.  
Quality standards thus complement incentive mechanisms with their focus on 
achieving outcomes. The aim of control mechanisms can be seen as guarantee-
ing a minimum standard of service to all jobseekers, which is a key factor in 
delivering public services. The increased prescription of services in Australia 
should indeed be interpreted in this way. Because the former contract arrange-
ments led to a lack of services for some jobseekers, in the new contract the 
government has defined standards (e.g. meetings every two weeks) that must be 
met for all jobseekers, although providers are free to choose a higher level of 
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 service if this leads to better outcomes. Interestingly, there are two divergent ten-
dencies at the moment. Whereas for Australia a stronger use of control 
instruments can be observed, the Netherlands seems to be reducing its regula-
tions on private providers. Both countries seem to be evaluating the optimal 
extent of rules and have not yet found a definite answer. The basic trade-off is 
between the higher accountability of providers for their outcomes on the one 
hand and the freedom that they want to have in order to achieve these outcomes 
given their greater responsibilities (in particular financial responsibilities) on the 
other hand. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper examined the mechanisms by which governments can manage 
contractual relationships in the field of public employment services. These 
contracting arrangements usually can be interpreted as principal-agent relations. 
The aim of this paper was to analyze in detail these principal-agent relations for 
three countries in which public employment services have been contracted out 
nationwide or, in the case of the U.K., in large-scale projects. I have identified 
three distinct governance mechanisms – incentive, information, and control 
mechanisms – which can serve as a useful tool for the analysis of other contract 
regimes as well. Incentive mechanisms using outcome-related payments are cer-
tainly the most widespread instrument. However, rather than paying completely 
outcome-based premiums, the purchaser and providers agree on a risk-sharing 
strategy that pays providers a fixed commencement fee. Although incentives are 
a big part of the story, which is reflected by the space devoted to them in this 
paper, efficient contract management also needs to take into account the infor-
mation challenge for governments as principals. An increased transparency of 
information can be achieved either by (indirect) benchmarking or (direct) monito-
ring. The Australian Star Rating, in particular, is a very effective approach to 
benchmarking providers. Indeed, Australia shows how incentive and information 
mechanisms can complement each other. Monitoring, on the other hand, is a 
useful tool to increase information on the process of work rather than on job out-
comes only. For both, benchmarking and monitoring, a sophisticated IT structure 
is essential. Finally, control mechanisms – in the form of rules and regulations – 
should not be used extensively because they do not square well with the ration-
ale of service flexibility through contracting. Nevertheless, the example of quality 
control again shows that pure incentive mechanisms will not yield optimal outco-
mes in terms of equal services to all jobseekers. 
What is needed is an integrated governance approach.  This paper has shown 
that contracting for public employment services should not rely exclusively on 
incentive mechanisms, as it often has in the past. On the contrary, a coherent 
contract management approach should make use of information mechanisms 
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 and control mechanisms in order to complement one-sided, outcome-related 
payments. The incomplete nature of contracts and the character of public em-
ployment services as social services require these instruments as safeguards in 
performance-related contracts. Thus, starting from outcome-based payments, 
benchmarking systems should be implemented and providers monitored by 
means of auditing visits and industry-wide quality standards. 
The development of an integrated governance approach in practice is a challeng-
ing task; indeed, public purchasers have only started to develop a “contract 
management capacity” (Brown and Potoski 2003b) to govern private providers. 
Brown and Potoski (2003b, 155) distinguish three fields for which special exper-
tise is required: first, the “feasibility assessment capacity,” which includes the 
make-or-buy decision about a good or service and thus also the suitability of a 
good or service to be procured from third parties; second, the “implementation 
capacity,” which includes the capacity to set up tenders, select providers, and 
design and negotiate contracts; and third, the “evaluation capacity,” used to 
evaluate and monitor the performance of private providers. Poor contract per-
formance can result from insufficient management capacity in any one of these 
functional areas. The governance mechanisms that have been discussed in this 
paper can be subsumed under the latter two capacities: the implementation ca-
pacity of effective contracts (incentives) and the evaluation capacity (information 
and control). This focus is in line with the shift in research priorities. Whereas 
traditional research often has exclusively focused on the first capacity, the make-
or-buy decision, second-generation scholarship (such as this paper) tends to em-
phasize the importance of how contracting-out is implemented and evaluated. 
For employment services, the use of private providers in placement services 
(rather than training services) is a very recent development. Thus, further interna-
tional comparisons of the positive (rather than the normative) design of these 
mechanisms in employment services would enhance our understanding of the 
strengths and pitfalls of contracting for this relevant area of social services, and at 
the same time allow for learning from best practices across countries. 
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